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What They See is What We Get in Film
In the cinema theatre the spectator is an outsider observing events on view
in a film. How can this external spectator be made to engage thickly with
what is represented as though they were actually present in the situations
projected on the screen?1 This seems to me to be the biggest challenge for
cinema, indeed for all narrative art, I think.
One might distinguish two more or less opposed strategies. The first would
be for the filmmaker to use panning shots, and the full range of camera options
to present the world as though being viewed from an all-seeing, divine point of
view capable of noticing all the details. This would make the representation
seem transparent. The second would be to lure the external spectator into
the fiction by showing the fictional world as it would be seen by internal
spectators.
These strategies may both have to deal with moments of inauthenticity.
I think such inauthenticities can often be prevented by revealing the fact of
the representation as such; by making explicit the cooperation between the
film – with its actors, camera, editors, directors – and the spectators in the
cinema theatre. The films of Bresson are an example of the second strategy.
He shows what a putative internal spectator would be perceiving: they see
what we in the cinema theatre will come to see.
Robert Bresson’s last film, L’Argent, is a masterpiece, and his Notes on
the Cinematograph is a singularly beautiful book, expounding, one could say,
the insights Bresson found in his cinematography.2 Below, I use both the
film and the book to philosophise about film, without theory. The book does
not present a theory and the film is not an illustration of the insights and
reflections in the book; both are on a par. You could appreciate either of
them and still be surprised by what you find in the other. Both proceed by
presenting their content without accompanying explanation, and it is up to
us to explore what we are presented with.
The title of this article, ‘What They See Is What We Get’, is meant to
provoke argument.3 Put bluntly, I suggest that when watching certain films
in the cinema we get to see what the fictional characters in the film see. On
the view I wish to develop, perception is more important for the appreciation
of fiction films than imagination is. In a number of ways reality literally helps
us see the fictional.4
I. CENTRALLY SEEING AFFORDANCES
We do not see the actual scenes which the camera has captured themselves,
since these things, persons and events are not here with us, the spectators.
When we see something, thickly, in real life we can walk towards it, circle
around it, touch it, smell it, and so on. We cannot do these things with
what we see in a film. Yet neither are we imagining the things that we see
there. We are, as Kendall Walton argues, imagining seeing these things that
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are projected onto the screen before us, and this ‘imagining seeing’ is a case
of seeing them.5 We see something and know it to be something somewhere
else, not in our space and time.
If I were to look through binoculars – perhaps also if I look via a mirror –
at a woman filling a coffee cup, I am actually seeing her filling the cup, even
though it all happens elsewhere – the gap can be crossed, it is merely spatial.
There is a conceptual gap between the woman in the film and us seeing her,
though (see figure 1). We must understand the concept of representation.
A representation is something in its own right. When we hold and view a
photograph or read the paper, or hear a poem its properties are present to the
senses. Through these properties a representation presents something to the
mind which is not present to the senses: the things represented. We see the
woman [Sylvie Van den Elsen] represented in the film, and it remains normally
unclear how one might get from where one is to where she is. It seems to
require some form of complicated, abstract research. This has nothing to do
with the fact that the film is fictional. Our incapacity to interact with the
woman is not due to the fact that she is a fictional character but to the fact
that she is represented.
Figure 1: Robert Bresson: still from L’Argent
I can acentrally imagine seeing the woman fill a cup – as if from no point of
view – or imagine seeing her centrally from some particular person’s point of
view.6 According to Richard Wollheim, such a particular spectator – internal
to the represented situation – though they may not be depicted, would be
invested with a psychological repertoire. That is what makes them particular,
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after all. That particular person may be, for instance, the woman’s father
who thinks highly of her, or her guest who is happy to be handed a cup of
coffee to begin with. According to Wollheim, the psychological repertoire of
the invisible internal spectator colours the way the woman is shown – we see
her like they see her. And this is what interests me: how can a film show
something as seen by someone particular?
Traditionally, subjective shots are used to show something a character is
seeing. Subjective shots induce a seeing that is loaded with a psychological
repertoire that is introduced by the narrative: first we see the protagonist
looking in a certain direction, then, by convention, we come to see what they
are looking at. Thus, in a subjective shot it is the story that tells us what to
watch for, and hence what to see.7 Almost no shots in L’Argent are subjective
in this conventional sense, constructed by editing, acting and movements of
the camera.
Bresson’s shots are not pre-arranged by the film’s narrative like this:
‘Don’t show all sides of things. A margin of indefiniteness.’8 The ‘indefi-
nite’ shots precede the narrative, build it, if you want – as perceptions build
an event in real life. Many shots in L’Argent convey a view of things invested
with meanings and values that are actually at stake in the scene, there for all
to see, so to speak.9
Figure 2: ‘See beings and things in their separate parts.’ Robert Bresson: still from
L’Argent
Through the image in figure 2, the spectator gets close to what the man in the
picture, Yvon Targe [Christian Patey], is working with. We, too, concentrate
exclusively on his action while the character realises the affordances of the
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oil inlet in the wall. An affordance is, so to speak, that which some artefact
more or less ‘asks’ the perceiver to do with it – like a chair ‘asking’ one to
be sat upon. I will return to this concept shortly. We are engrossed in the
inlet as much as the antagonist is. Watching what happens, we match Yvon’s
preoccupations. Often, in Bresson’s films we are not given much more than
what the characters themselves perceive while dealing with the same clues.
It seems only right to think that in such instances we perceive what they are
perceiving, in its worldly meaningfulness. We see what Yvon sees but are not
told by convention that this is what is happening. We are not shown Yvon
looking at what he is doing. The relevant affordances are generally apparent
to people and don’t require subjective shots for us to notice them.10 We are
centrally seeing the same things, persons and events that the characters are
privy to.
Near the end of L’Argent, when the woman puts the money she has just
withdrawn at the bank in her purse, we are also shown Yvon noticing this
(see page 370). But Yvon seems not to be interested in the money – Bresson
merely shows something the woman is preoccupied with and its visibility to
a passer-by as such, all from the point of view of the woman. It may seem
like Bresson is daring us to think that Yvon is already planning to go after
her money as we would normally interpret a sequence of images like these
following the principle that such things are shown for a narrative reason. But,
really, Bresson is leaving it up to us to decide just what Yvon is registering.
First, the woman is seen putting her money away (fig. 3a), then she sees
someone looking at her (fig. 3b, shown over the shoulder), and then, when
the man (Yvon) walks away, she returns to her task (fig. 3c). Bresson:
See beings and things in their separate parts. Render them inde-
pendent in order to give them a new dependence.11
The reality of these ‘beings and things’ is not to be altered by acting or
narrative steering but by their own affordances as recognised both by the
characters and the spectators.
II. ‘COMMUNICATING IMPRESSIONS AND SENSATIONS’
Bresson is adept at summoning up reality with a single sound or partial image.
In Les dames du Bois de Boulogne at one point you hear a blackbird, and it
takes you inside the film’s scenery in the park. Bresson:
Accustom the public to divining the whole of which they are given
only a part. Make people diviners. Make them desire it.12
Bresson intimates the real to the external spectators in the cinema, by visual
or auditory synecdoche, or pars pro toto. We see part of the action, particu-
larly the affordances of the objects acted upon, as a living part of the reality
of the on-screen world. An affordance is not just a property of something, but
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a. 1:02:19
b. 1:02:23
c. 1:02:28
Figure 3: Three juxtaposed shots from Ł’Argent, with affordances due to the psy-
chological repertoire of the woman – we see her seeing these things.
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a perception of something as allowing certain behaviour; more or less inviting
it. What Bresson achieves is no small feat. He does not just show objects
but shows them as perceived centrally for their affordances. A chair at the
bottom of the sea is not an affordance – it turns into one by being perceived
by someone who considers sitting on it. Filmed in such a way as to allow the
viewer to share that affordance-generating perception had by the on-screen
character, it can take the viewer themselves into the world on screen. An
affordance is a subjective property – I mean ‘subjective’ as ‘perceivable only
by (human) subjects’, not as ‘merely private’.13
How much of our own surroundings do we consciously perceive in real
life, for instance when we enter the kitchen to fill a coffee cup? We see the
world’s subjective properties as they present themselves meaningfully to us.
Of course, we know full well that the world does not stop at the limits of our
perceptions. What we perceive in films we, or our imaginations, take to be no
less aspects of real life. That assumption is the necessary viewers’ contribution
to the success of a film. Extended or substantial panning shots arguably stem
from a lack of trust in this contribution of the external spectator; whereas
Bresson expressly expects it.
Thus, in Bresson’s scenes we see what is meaningful to the characters.
The core of their perceptions are the affordances that objects and situations
have in store for them. Figure 1 not only shows the woman pouring coffee in
a cup but, also, how she steadies the cap of the coffee pot. We do not just
see an action, but also a certain dedication, a virtuous consideration – her
subjectivity. We do not need to see the woman’s face to notice this, or better:
if we did see her face we would be more concerned with what goes on in her
mind. The face would distract us from the meaning of the gesture. The scene
and Bresson’s written commitments coincide. Neither merely illustrates the
other.
The task of the cinematographer – or film-maker – is, in Bresson’s words:
‘To communicate impressions, sensations’, and: ‘Cut out what would deflect
attention elsewhere.’14 Clearly, the aim is to convey subjective awareness of
the situations in the film. And the result is:
Theatre and cinema [i.e. traditional cinema that uses theatrical
conventions]: alternation of believing and not believing. [Bres-
son’s] Cinematography: continually believing.15
In stage theatre (and cinema) we know we are looking at real people (actors)
– and do not believe in the reality of the fiction – yet at times we do come to
believe in the fiction. In cinematography, in contrast, we constantly believe
what we are seeing. The woman’s pouring the coffee, carefully, is real.
Bresson accommodates our belief in the reality of these sounds and images
of affordances without guiding us in a prefigured manner through an intricate
and detailed narrative toward an interpretation which veils the affordances.
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Instead, he works with the reality that we hear and see and stimulates us to
bring their juxtapositions to life.16 These sounds and shots are the part of the
reality that the character, too, sees and hears – the world’s affordances, open
to their actions. In L’Argent we experience what the characters experience in
handling things. With them, we experience how, in these parts and aspects,
the world gazes at them, authentically, as it would, and does. Reality does
not lie. The ground of every affordance, and of all authenticity I think, is this
real-life world-to-perception direction of fit.17
Though as a matter of fact, spectators in the cinema theatre are outsiders
to the world in the film, by presenting the subjective aspect of things and
events, films like Robert Bresson’s L’Argent – and Nuri Bilge Ceylan’s Uzak
– change the external spectators into internal spectators.18 Both the external
spectators and the internal ones (the fictional characters) register these sub-
jective properties, these affordances of things, and in so doing, the external
spectators join the fictional characters as internal spectators. The narratives
of Bresson – and Ceylan – are quite intimate. In fact, these narratives, more
often than not, are nearer to the everyday chaos, as one could call it, of the
perceptual here and now than those we know from major box office films.
This is, I believe, because Bresson’s films – and Ceylan’s – work with reality
itself.
III. ACTORS AND MODELS
When in real life we see another person, they may be a competitor for affor-
dances that we are about to realise – we may notice what they are doing on
the park path that we are taking, and with the bench we are heading towards
in order to read a book. Seeing that other person like this, as a competitor,
is seeing them as an object, according to a narrative that we have in our
mind, which involves affordances like those just mentioned. This is merely
noting the other, like we note the path, the bench. We do this all the time
with people – recognising others as tokens of some type, where we decide the
type.19 But then, when they look directly at you, your pre-occupation with
them as affordances changes drastically. The other turns into a subject, a
person, someone like us. And both of us are absorbed in this experience of
reciprocity. This is Sartre’s way of explaining how we see another as a person.
‘ “Being-seen-by-the-other” is the truth of “Seeing-the-Other” ’.20
How, though, are we to think about this reciprocal recognition in the cases
of external spectators in the theatre, internal ones in the fiction, and actors
looking at each other? Characters and actors do not look back at external
spectators, fictional characters do not exist hence cannot gaze at each other,
and the actors are not supposed to figure as themselves in the fiction film.
Stage actors are present in person to their audience in the theatre, and
the audience is present to them. Stage actors try to portray the characters,
inducing the audience to cooperate in the process of bringing the character,
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as such, to life. It is not that each little piece of behaviour must be scripted,
but it does help if there is a clear consistency in the actions and situations
which fits the narrative.
Bresson views the traditional way of making films as the recording of ac-
tors playing roles on a stage. Filmmakers should not use actors who perform
as if they are going through all sorts of emotions, not their own, but sup-
posedly experienced by their characters. According to Bresson, in contrast,
cinematography – i.e., filmmaking as he conceives it – should make use of
technical means specifically available to film, and not those of other art forms
such as stage acting. Cameras and microphones record real events, and these
recordings are edited. Editing of scenes is, also, unavailable to performances
on stage.21
According to Bresson, actors in cinema (‘filmed theatre’) aim at a plausible
rendering of their character. It is this view, that characters must be brought
to life through play-acting, I think, that makes it particularly challenging for
cinema to convey a character noticing an affordance in something, as well as
seeing another character as a subject and not an object, or a type of person, or
a ‘plausible person’. Actors can fake their gazing. Bresson, in contrast, works
with models who do not fake, but, like the models of the painter, remain the
individuals that they are:
Models. Their way of being the people of your film is by being
themselves, by remaining what they are. (Even in contradiction
with what you had imagined.)22
Models are authentic because they are not pretending. We can see that. But
one question remains: how can these ‘relations with the objects and persons
around them’ be shown to outside spectators, from the outside, and by a
camera at that? How can subjective reciprocity be captured by a camera – a
machine? Does not the camera objectify, and hence annul the subjective?
How can one depict an object or situation as seen by someone particular,
i.e. by someone with a particular psychological repertoire? Richard Wollheim
discusses this question in the chapter in his Painting as an art, on ‘The spec-
tator in the picture’, a discussion which is helpful for the philosophy of film.23
Furthermore, in fiction films, the people are a figment of the narrative, they
are not real, or are they? How can one character look at another as a subject
when neither really exists? In other words, perhaps: whose subjectivity is
in play when characters in a film gaze at one another, or when they look at
things and events? Who is looking? I will come to this shortly.
I concluded section II with the view that reality does not lie. ‘The ground
of every affordance, and of all authenticity . . . is this world-to-perception
direction of fit.’ This same authenticity is found in the exchange of gazes be-
tween any two persons. The reciprocity involved in this is what distinguishes
looking at someone from observing them. Hence the problem of the observ-
ing external spectator. We cannot observe a person without removing their
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personhood and turning them into a type. That is, without overlaying what
we see with what a particular narrative instructs us to see. Hence Bresson’s
critique of acting. Acting turns a person into a character, a type, hiding the
individual.
A director drives his actors to simulate fictitious human beings in
the midst of objects that are not so.24
Model. The cause which makes him say this sentence or make that
movement is not in him, it is in you [the director]. The causes
are not in the models. [In] cinema-films, the actor must make us
believe that the cause is in him.25
Acting may be as problematic as Bresson thinks. Looking at another
person and meeting their gaze is not. Lee Strasberg, one of the founding
fathers of Method Acting, started from a seemingly similar position regarding
the actor, ‘emotional realism’.26 The camera will show the real emotions in
the actor. The actor should not play. Instead, the actor is to become the
character in real life, outside the studio, so that in front of the camera they
do not have to act. No method acting for Bresson, though, as we saw. He
works with models, who merely have to be who they are.
Every movement reveals us (Montaigne). But it only reveals us if
it is automatic (not commanded, not willed).27
Models. What they lose in apparent prominence during the shoot-
ing, they gain in depth and in truth on the screen. It is the flattest
and dullest parts that have in the end the most life.28
IV. WHAT WE SEE IN A GAZE
The posture and gaze of Bresson’s models may be authentic, deep and true,
and may thus add reality to the events and actions in the film for expressing
their real subjectivity. Yet, in L’Argent, the gazes are not dialogical – not
as Sartre would have it, where seeing the other is turned true by ‘Being-
seen-by-the-other’. The idea that models, in contrast to actors, produce more
life on the screen confuses me, though, as there is little facial expression
apparent in Bresson’s models. But I may be mistaken. In the 1983 Cannes
Film Festival press conference with Bresson and his cast, a number of things
are worth noting. First, the audience did not seem to understand the film
very well and, rather tragically, this annoyed Bresson. But, secondly, and
particularly interesting, I felt immediately at home with Yvon and his wife
and the woman (the models who played these characters), as they were sitting
next to Bresson. They were just like in the film. Or should I say, they were
really themselves in the film?
The point I wish to emphasise here is that the gaze of real persons – actors
and models alike – plays a major role in luring the external spectator into a
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fiction. A gaze has two aspects: Person A’s look upon, or at, Person B’s face;
and B’s awareness of A seeing B. Someone’s gaze normally reveals aspects
of the one it is aimed at. As it would, given the fact that looking at each
other is the prime means for members of a biological species such as ours, for
reciprocally recognising and expressing feelings and intentions.29 In real life,
these two aspects form a single whole. In gazing at each other, two persons
acknowledge each other’s existence – to each other as much as to themselves.
Gazing at each other has existential force: it authenticates both persons who
engage in it.
The authenticity of persons gazing at each other may, however, be lost
in traditional cinematic constructions. A good camera operator and a good
editor can ‘match eyelines’ so it convincingly looks like Person A is looking at
Person B (and then B is looking at A) in the shot/reverse shot construction.
But the apparent continuity is construed, instead of being a reproduction of
a real exchange.30 This can disturb the authenticity of the gazing, sometimes
subtly, sometimes more overtly.
One could film an exchange between two people authentically by two
cameras positioned along the axis of the interaction between A and B, in
such a way that neither camera shows up in any of the shots. One can also
use a single camera showing both antagonists at the same time. We see this
in a scene in the Romanian film 4 Months, 3 Weeks and 2 Days, directed
by Cristian Mungiu (2007), where Otilia [Anamaria Marinca] and Alexandru
[Adi Radu] are shown during a long conversation actually looking at each
other.31 Another way out of this predicament of cinema may, indeed, be a
Bressonian approach to treating the actor as a model, to ensure some other
way for such an onscreen couple to manifest their subjective reality.
Models who have become automatic [. . . ] and are then dropped
in the [middle] of the events of your film – their relations with the
objects and persons around them will be right, because they will
not be thought.32
But I don’t want to give up too soon on the reciprocal nature of the gaze. I
think capturing two characters gazing at each other must of necessity involve
their actors’ reciprocal personal gazes.
As we know from selfies, one can look at a camera feigning to be looking
at someone particular, presumably the person you intend to send your selfie
to – and addressing them in a certain meaningful way. But such gazing is one-
directional. Viewing a selfie one can only see to whom the gaze is addressed if
one already knows: the other person is a projection, not a real person present
to the gaze. One can see that in the gaze, if only one develops an interest in
it.
If one is actually looking at someone, an on-going to-and-fro developing
exchange invests each of the two looks with a complicated but shared personal
communication – and, what is more: this provides some kind of existential
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proof of the reality of both persons. I cannot think of any other way to
prove a person’s existence. We can feign such gazing by looking at a camera,
but cannot look at another person as if looking at someone else. Unless one
chooses to construct the interaction in a shot/reverse shot manner so as to
represent character types. That is not so much a reproduction of stage acting,
as Bresson thinks, but, rather, an animation of some sort.33
I cannot look at you as though looking at my mother. My incapability is
not due to a lack of imaginative creativity, but to the absence of my mother’s
subjectivity in you. So it seems that an actor looking at another actor cannot
fake looking at a character – they meet each other’s personal gaze.34 Thus,
no matter what characteristics the script dictates that the characters have,
the gazing from one actor to another will be authentic. Actors looking at
each other provide an authenticity which forms the core of their characters’
mutual gazing. This makes them – actors/characters gazing at each other –
the internal spectators in the fiction who bring the film world to life. They
do this, one might say, amongst other things, for the sake of the external
spectator.35
Bresson wants his models to relate, like people do, to what is really before
them, however, he concentrates more on objects and situations than on the
human beings they are confronted with.36 At least, that is the impression
one might get from watching L’Argent (or Pickpocket). This gives his cine-
matography a somewhat abstract look; a look that suggests that humanity
will fall into place as a consequence of getting the environmental relations
right, which I think is indeed a large part of getting things right.37
V. THE CAMERA
Many have commented that looking at a photo is like seeing, or even is seeing,
the thing depicted in it without actually being present to it.38 Journalistic
photographs seem to us to transparently reveal the reality they capture. As
a result of a trick played on us by the camera, the camera shows the image
as if it is taken from nowhere.39 Yet, the camera is in actuality present in
the situation photographed – how else can it be used to take the picture?
Nothing in press photos, though, betrays the presence of the camera or the
person wielding it. Yet, photographers really are internal spectators in the
situation.
That a journalistic photograph presents a god-like observer’s point of view
illustrates how we, the spectators do not look at the scene from the particular
photographer’s psychological perspective. Instead, we bring nothing to the
photograph other than our own general beliefs, feelings and psychological
make-up. There is no story in a still picture to prefocus or prompt us to
encounter the photograph in a particular way. We can easily project some
narrative on it – like one delivered by the report in the newspaper – and
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observe the events in the picture. Any moral response to the photograph
is a product of our extra-photographic knowledge of the relevant real-life
circumstances and situation that contextualises what has been photographed.
In press photos we see types, not persons.40 Types fit narratives, ideologies
and political views, whereas individual persons escape this ‘typecasting’.41
Bresson’s cinematography can be viewed as an alternative for such views
from nowhere.
From the spectator’s point of view it is as if in a press photo no-one stands
in our way whilst we view reality as it is. But of course, at least a camera
and the photographer stand, or have stood, in our way. Both are necessarily
present in the situation where the shot is, or was, taken. But both are equally
necessarily absent from the image in a journalistic photo. Perhaps, in a film
the presence and authenticity of the models require a camera that is palpably
present for the external spectator?
Without suggesting that Bresson has a similar god’s eye point of view in
mind in his cinematography, neither does he make the camera present to the
spectator. He juxtaposes shots in a way that make us aware of the editing,
but keeps us concentrated on the events portrayed. (See the shot of the coffee
cup in figure 4). We realise Bresson’s interferences, but not so much those of
the camera.
Figure 4: Robert Bresson: L’Argent
The truth of fiction films is to their fictional worlds, as Kendall Walton ar-
gues.42 They are true in their own right – and that includes, or should include
that they be more or less plausible or convincing aesthetically, psychologically
and narratively. They are not presented as being true to the real world. But
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a scene in a fiction film is true to the fictional world only if it is perceived as
such – by the external spectator and, perhaps even more fundamentally, by
the characters in the fictional world. Indeed, the spectators’ perception of the
truth of the fiction is a product of the characters’ reciprocal recognition of
each other and of their surroundings; a recognition constituted by the reality
of their joint gazing. A film’s authenticity is the perceived authenticity of
objects, events and looks – the authenticity of affordances, gazes, in short:
the fictional world’s subjective properties. For Walton, the fictional reality of
a fiction film is due to the coherence of the film. But Bresson uses real sights
and sounds and real persons (models). While Bresson’s cinematography does
not contradict Walton’s view, Walton need not go as far as Bresson does.
Right in the middle between us and the fiction projected onto the screen
there is the camera. The camera in a fiction film does not need to behave
as a situation’s external observer – why it might do, would be a matter of
choice. The spectator, however, cannot but act as external since they are
conceptually excluded from the world viewed on the screen. Which strategies
are available to films to make their spectators less distant observers? I submit
that one such strategy of fiction films is to present us with spectators within
the fictional film world – who perceive the events and the other characters
on our behalf. Because such internal spectators are moral agents in the film
world we acentrally imagine seeing the events from their point of view – as
the moral agents that we are, watching films as if they were reporting actual
events.
The notion of the internal spectator is developed by Richard Wollheim
who sees their presence in certain paintings, most notably those of Edouard
Manet.43 For instance, we see a woman serving drinks behind a bar, staring
absent-mindedly at some patron, or better looking straight through them (see
fig. 5). Looking at the woman we feel that someone is noticing her stare. It
is not as though no-one sees this happen and some god-like absent observer
catches the image and reproduces it. We see the woman the way someone
in the bar is currently seeing her – you can see that from her staring. And
the one seeing her has a certain psychological repertoire, as Wollheim calls
it: he is not a machine – an all-seeing camera – but a certain person. In this
painting, Manet provides us with a clue about the identity of this person, in
the mirror in the back, to the right – but Manet needn’t have done so for
the image to reveal that it is being seen by an internal spectator, Wollheim
argues. Indeed, in many of his other paintings Manet does not do this.
Wollheim is interested in the phenomenon of the internal spectator be-
cause of the possibility that something may be depicted from the point of
view of a person with a particular psychological repertoire that informs the
view in the picture. We saw this in Bresson’s ‘affordance images’ which show
how the characters in the fiction view things. Wollheim asks his readers to
imagine a picture of Waterloo in ruins after Napoleon’s defeat, from the point
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Figure 5: Edouard Manet: Bar aux Folies-Bergère, 1882, © The Samuel Courtauld
Trust, The Courtauld Gallery, London
of view of Napoleon surveying the battle field and realising that the end has
come. You would see devastation all around. If, by contrast the ruins were
depicted from the point of view of the victors, the image would have had a
different, more festive expression.
One other way to lure the external spectators, in the cinema theatre, into
the film world is by turning the camera (and its handler) into a presence in
the film world.44 In this way, the recording resembles that of two persons
looking at each other: the camera looks at a character who acknowledges the
camera as a stand-in for the one handling it. Thus, the external spectator
acquires an internal view, so to speak, of the character (and the scenery and
parts thereof) – from the psychological repertoire that the camera is invested
with. Bresson, I think, makes no use of this strategy. His models, too, ignore
the camera, as if it weren’t there.
We see the camera almost ‘role-play’ its own presence in real life footage
shot by victims of disasters such as the 9/11 attacks on the WTC towers
in New York, or the tsunami following the Great East Japan Earthquake
on 11 March 2011. This footage shows people recording their own predica-
ment. Their fears and curiosity control the movements of the camera, not a
directorial scenario. At times, their behaviour produces inscrutable imagery
379
What They See is What We Get in Film
Figure 6: Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March 2011
– for instance, when they flee from the surge of the tsunami that is pushing
aside their cars, roads, homes, their lifeworld, or from the dust clouds of the
collapsing Twin Towers.
Curiously, these latter images, which are taken with hand-held cameras,
hardly ever make it into the documentaries that we make of these events.
That should give us pause. The narrative of a documentary requires images
that the narrator can control. But the result of such narrativisation is a loss
of reality. In fiction films, the hand-held camera resurfaces as a strategy in
Dogma ’95 films like Thomas Vinterberg’s Festen (1998) and Jagten (2012),
and also more recently in Erik Poppe’s Utøya, 22. June (2018).
We see a certain combination of these strategies – Bresson’s use of models,
and a camera that is present and near – in Nuri Bilge Ceylan’s Uzak (2002),
especially in a scene near the end of the film where the two main characters
have a decisive quarrel. The camera is close to everything in the narrow
space of the apartment where the scene is taking place, and where the two
antagonists are physically present to each other. You can see that. The
director is not the external puppeteer of the film world he is controlling and
observing, but is integrated in it: it is Ceylan’s flat apartment, the characters
are played by his family members – all they have to do is play having trouble
being together. And they may not even have to play that: perhaps it is
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all really happening – both improvised and true. That is the point: the
authenticity of this scene is personal. Interestingly, we succeed in empathising
with both characters. The characters are internal spectators in the film. We
get to see what and whom they see.
Figure 7: Nuri-Bilge Ceylan: Uzak
Uzak is a fiction film that shows the value of Aristotle’s distinction between
history and poetry, and which reveals the applicability of this distinction to
documentary and fiction films. The difference between documentary and
fiction, too, is not one of style.
The difference between the historian and the poet is not that the
one writes in prose and the other in verse . . . The difference is
that the one tells of what has happened, the other of the kinds
of things that might happen. For this reason poetry is something
more philosophical and more worthy of serious attention than his-
tory; for while poetry is concerned with universal truths, history
treats of particular facts. [. . . ] By universal truths are to be un-
derstood the kinds of thing a certain type of person will probably
or necessarily say or do in a given situation. 45
Does Aristotle mean that fictions produce the universalisation that ethicists
require? Not likely. For all we know the ‘type of person’ at stake in Uzak
could be just these token people, these two cousins. They show the kinds
of thing someone with their specific traits will probably or necessarily say
or do under these circumstances. Fictions are after more personal bait than
ethical universalisation: us. Spectators using their power of judgement have
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the capacity to decide which ‘kinds of thing a certain type of person will
probably or necessarily say or do in a given situation.’ We decide about the
probability – we accept it or we do not.
The direction of fit of fiction films is not work-to-world, but work-to-
psychology. When a film is true to itself, this shows in its being true to our
psychology and that of the characters. We, the spectators of the film, are real
– we have subjectivity – and we need an entrance into the world projected
onto the screen. We need a real connection. ‘What our eyes and ears require
is not the realistic persona but the real person.’46 With film the character
as an internal spectator (as in the films of Ceylan and Vinterberg, and with
Bresson’s models) and the reality of sounds and visions per se (in the films
of Bresson and Dogma ’95) fulfil that need. This is how, in film, reality
tells the fiction. The truths Aristotle refers to are universal in so far as they
describe the way we fit within the world, the way we are at home in it, as the
persons that we are, perceiving its affordances and the others that we share
this lifeworld with.
When a film matches all that, by showing real affordances, real sounds
and real exchanges of gazes, it meets the challenge I started out with. It
will be more true, in the Aristotelian sense, than a documentary. It is still a
representation of the world, and not the actual world, and we are still not the
ones gazed at, nor the ones realising the affordances that are shown. All of
this remains well within the on-screen world. But having internal spectators
engage with that world on our behalf, as authentic as that can get, proves
Aristotle’s point that art can be more true than history, as true as reality.
So film can do something which Aristotle might have appreciated. It can
prove psychologically the universal truth to be found in the interactions of a
certain person in a particular situation. The shot/reverse shot construction
may be advantageous for making characters put on their fictional looks, al-
lowing the director to construct an exchange of gazes informed exclusively by
narrative strands in the film.47 But such films are more like animation films
than their god-like observing camerawork suggests. In my view, Bresson or
Ceylan, among a few others, show a different way ahead.48
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NOTES
1We use thick concepts to describe
moral situations, choices, actions and
events. Bernard Williams introduces the
term as follows: ‘If a concept of this kind
applies, this often provides someone with a
reason to act, though that reason need not
be a decisive one and may be outweighed
by other reasons [. . . ]’ Williams 1985, p.
140. I use ‘thick’, in line with the term
Williams’ coined, as a qualifier of percep-
tions, situations, and so on, and am most
interested in film’s powers to match real
life thick so-an-sos, or in other words: to
make the external spectator’s perception
thick.
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2The title of the book is sometimes
translated as Notes on the Cinematogra-
pher, but the cinematograph is a more
literal translation of the French ‘ciné-
matographe’.
3This is definitely different from the no-
tion of WYSIWYG that we came to know
in the early days of the computer. WYSI-
WYG was the acronym of What You See
Is What You Get. It brought to mind that
people no longer had to be programmers
to process their texts. In WYSIWYG text
editors, the code was kept invisible for the
end-user. I love the graphical interface, as
we call it nowadays, but would rather work
in LATEX, open source software that allows
me to work in code and trust the software
to deliver the goods.
4Van Gerwen 2002.
5See Walton 1998.
6In Wollheim 1984, 72-96.
7We can see a lot more in another’s gaze
than we have come to think, I believe. We
may have been misled by a century of con-
structed gazes. The shot/reverse shot, the
over-the-shoulder shot – they mostly show
gazes not actually addressed to the per-
son supposedly gazed at. This teaches us,
external viewers, to jump to conclusions
about gazes in films – we do not so much
gather our insights in the characters’ men-
tal states from their gazes but project what
we are to expect there on account of the
narrative about them.
8Bresson 2016, 64.
9All of this is central to Bresson’s cin-
ematography, as he calls it, his individual
style, as Wollheim might call it. See Woll-
heim 1993 for a clear exposition of individ-
ual style in painting.
10J.J. Gibson 1986. I agree with Gibson
that perception is the processing of the af-
fordances of objects, situations, events and
people.
11Bresson 2016, 57.
12Bresson 2016, 67.
13See Van Gerwen 2018, chapter ‘Sub-
jectivity’, § ‘Subjective Realism’, in Dutch.
14Bresson 2016, 53 and, respectively, 56.
15Bresson 2016, 40
16And see p. 369, above, where I discuss
Bresson 2016, 67.
17I believe we should think of the world
as subvenient under the meanings of our
‘impressions and perceptions’, rather than
as the latter supervening on the objective.
The subjective precedes the objective. See
Van Gerwen 2018 (in Dutch).
18I do not use ‘subjective’ pejoratively,
on the contrary.
19It is quite a large step, I think, from
this everyday perceptual discrimination to
social, or systemic discrimination. Sys-
temic discrimination can only be removed
when we see the other as a person, as
James Baldwin is quoted saying in I am
not your negro: ‘You cannot lynch me
and keep me in ghettos without becom-
ing something monstrous yourselves. And
furthermore, you give me a terrifying ad-
vantage. You never had to look at me. I
had to look at you. I know more about you
than you know about me. Not everything
that is faced can be changed, but nothing
can be changed until it is faced.’ What we
do not face we cannot change.
20Sartre 1956. As long as you see the
other as an object, instead of as a subject,
you do not really see them for what they
are. See also Van Gerwen 2018, 176.
21Among the particular things issuing
from Bresson’s views is the parsimonious
dealing with sound and imagery: ‘What is
for the eye must not duplicate what is for
the ear.’ (Bresson 2016, 36).
22Bresson 2016, 52.
23Wollheim 1988.
24Bresson 2016, 59
25Bresson 2016, 38.
26Strasberg means that the emotions
that we see expressed in a face are real.
My interest is in a form of subjective re-
alism: a realism of the subjective proper-
ties of things and events in the world out
there. This is a realism in the philosoph-
ical sense of the term: the properties at
hand are there independent of the subject.
But how can subjective properties be there
in that sense? Clearly, their reality de-
pends on subjects? Yes, but not on any
one particular subject. All subjects should
be able to notice these subjective proper-
ties. Yet these properties are not objective,
they cannot be proven to exist by scientific
means.
27Bresson 2016, 83.
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28Bresson 2016, 45.
29See Fridlund 1997 and Frijda and
Tcherkassof 1997. For other members of
our species, someone must by default be-
tray themselves in their facial expression.
Empathy and expression have co-evolved
in tandem.
30If the camera showing B from over the
shoulder of A also shows part of A’s head,
the next shot showing A from the point of
view of B should show that camera. To
avoid that two series could be recorded
first and then edited together: first the
whole interchange from the point of view
of A, and then the interchange re-enacted,
now shown from B’s point of view. This
would however, result in gazes that do
not respond to the other while they make
the utterance that we hear. Inauthentic-
ity would be the result, even though that
result might look good, and might suffice
for certain narrative aims.
31Thanks to Britt Harrison for this ref-
erence.
32Bresson 2016, 16.
33I have no principled issue with
cartoon-like films. I love Sin City – though
that is a film expressly modeled after
Frank Miller’s comics it is based upon –
and the series Too Old to Die Young by
Carlos Winding Refn and Ed Brubaker.
However, so-called realist films are often
more animated than they profess.
34‘Two persons, looking each other in
the eye, see not their eyes but their looks.’
Bresson 2016, 11. I think it is difficult to
assess the truth in the actor’s movements,
unlike the truth in his gaze at a real per-
son. ‘Nine-tenths of our movements obey
habit and automatism. It is anti-nature to
subordinate them to will and to thought.’
Bresson 2016, 17.
35This is part of the cooperation be-
tween actors and spectators that I referred
to above.
36Perhaps he thinks that this cannot be
done with the hidden mental life of persons
– a Cartesian thought.
37We later find this approach in Dogma
’95’s first rule: ‘Shooting must be done
on location. Props and sets must not be
brought in (if a particular prop is neces-
sary for the story, a location must be cho-
sen where this prop is to be found).’
38Think of Roger Scruton 1983; Kendall
Walton 1984; Stanley Cavell 1979; Ariella
Azoulay 2008; Roland Barthes 1980. Gre-
gory Currie 1998b and 1998a has taken
this a trifle too literally. See above. Bres-
son rightly starts from film’s technological
apparatus to make sense of what we see in
the cinema theatre. What the spectator
sees is a product of shots, images, sounds
and editing.
39Cf. Nagel 1986. And see Wollheim
on acentral imagining as an imagining of
some situation not from a particular point
of view (see note 6).
40Jodi Bieber’s iconic portrait of Bibi
Aisha is one of a few exceptions that I
know of. See Van Gerwen 2013 and 2018,
120-123.
41Identity politics involves a protest
against viewing people as types, yet it
merely seems to suggest we switch to dif-
ferent types. But is it not normal, psy-
chologically, to see people as instances of
types at first sight? Yet we have a duty to
see others as the individuals they are, just
like we have a right to be seen as the per-
son we are. Fighting types is important,
but it is not enough by far.
42In Walton 1990.
43In Wollheim 1988.
44We see this, too, in Bresson’s remark:
‘Shooting with the same eyes and the same
ears today as yesterday. Unity, homogene-
ity.’ (Bresson 2016, 52). The director, too,
uses his own psychological repertoire as an
internal spectator. But in relation to the
events in the film this repertoire makes no
sense; it forms an artistic addition to the
individual style of the cinematographer.
45My italics. Aristotle 1965, 43-44.
46Bresson 2016, 67.
47‘A director drives his actors to simu-
late fictitious human beings in the midst
of objects that are not so.’ (Bresson 2016,
59)
48Thanks to Britt Harrison and Craig
Fox for their active engagement with the
argument, and Britt for detailed sugges-
tions.
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